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EARLY CONTINENTAL
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Babette Babich

During the years leading up to and after 1890-1930, the continental concep
tion of science had a far broader scope than the anglophone notion of science
today. Even today, the German term Wissenschaft embraces not only the natural
and the social sciences, including economics, l but also the full panoply of the
so-called humanities, including the theoretical study of art and theology, both
important in the nineteenth century for, among other things, the formation of
the life sciences. 2 Philosophy itself was also counted as a science and was, in its
phenomenological articulation, nothing less than the science of scientific origins
or "original science" the «Urwissenschaft" - as Martin Heidegger defined it in
1919,3 following his own intensive engagement with Edmund Hussed's Logical
Investigations.
It is also crucial for any discussion of continental philosophy of science
between 1890 and 1930 to emphasize that these were, in Winston Churchill's
words, "precarious times;' times of technological and social change and of revo
lution, scientific and politicaL In a positive reflection on the transformations of

1. See Ernst Haeckel, Systematische Phylogenie: Entwurfeines naWrlichen Systems der Organismen
auf Grund ihrer Stammesgeschichte (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1894-96).
2. See Bernhard Kleeberg, "God-Nature Progressing: Natural Theology in German Monism:'
Science in Context 20(3} (2007), as well as Mario Di Gregorio, From Here to Eternity: Ernst
Haeckel and Scientific Faith (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), and Burkhardt
Gladigow, "Pantheismus und Naturmystik:' in Die Trelll1ul1g von Natur und Geist, Rudiger
Bubner (ed.) (Munich: Fink, 1990).
3. Martin Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, Ted Sadler (trans.) (London:
Continuum, 2000), 3, I Iff. See for a broader discussion, Theodore Kisiel, Heideggers Way of
Thought (London: Continuum, 2002), 17ff.
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this period, Heidegger refers, as will Husserllater, to the "crisis of philosophy as
science;' noting in 1925 that all "sciences and groups of sciences are undergoing
a great revolution of a productive kind that has opened up new modes of ques
tioning, new possibilities, and new horizons:'4
These same critical years also saw astonishing industrial innovations, yielding
many of the still-familiar achievements of modern technology, from cars (the
four-wheeled automobile in 1892), airplanes (1903), and even moving side
walks (1893); from moving pictures (1895) to public radio broadcasting (in
1922, although Marconi first transmitted a radio signal in 1895) and television
broadcasting (1929). Wilhelm Rontgen took the first X-rays in 1895, while the
development of modern artillery began in 1897, and Robert Goddard launched
the first liquid-fueled rockets in 1926.
Continental philosophy of science has always featured reflection not only
on the technologies of scientific investigation but also on human perception
and technological circumspection. Louis Basso's 1925 essay, "Induction tech
nique et science experimentale" was central to Gaston Bachelard's 1928 disser
tation, Essai sur La connaissance approchee, because Basso raised the question
of the industrial arts as involving an inherently encompassing coordination of
mechanization and technique. s Heidegger had already emphasized in 1927 the
interaction between theoretical world-disclosure and scientific research equip
ment, points that continue in Patrick A. Heelan's (1926- ) reflections on Werner
Heisenberg's (1901-76) physical philosophy and Heelan's own subsequent elab
oration of the phenomenology of perception as a phenomenology of labora
tory discovery. 6 A similar focus on the researcher's art also characterizes Ernst
4. Martin Heidegger, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview;'
Charles Bambach (trans.), in Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to "Being and Time" and
Beyond, John van Buren (ed.) (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 148. Heidegger goes on to
detail the theory of relativity in physics along with the crisis of foundations in mathematics,
to which one must add quantum mechanics and the movement against mechanistic thinking
in the biological sciences.
5. Basso's "Induction technique et science experimentale," Revue philosophique de la France et
de letranger 99 (1925), with its focus on the industrial arts and the relation between practical
application and science along with its emphasis on technological style would be continued
in Jacques Ellul and Jean Baudrillard and in still more comprehensive detail in Siegfried
Giedlon's Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History (New York:
Norton, 1948). An account of the historical context of the development of French philosophy
of sCIence may be round in the introduction to Anastasios Brenner and Jean Gayon (eds),
French Studies in the Philosophy of Science (frankfurt: Springer, 2009).
6. Patnck A. Heelan, Quantum Mechanics and ObJectivity: The Physical Philosophy of Werner
Heiscnhcrg (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoft~ 1965). A new book by Kristian Camilleri, Heisenberg
alld the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: 'fhe Physicist as Philosopher (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 20(9), also considers Heisenberg'S philosophy of science and
quantum mechanics.
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Mach's (1838-1916) philosophical reflections on science and can be said to drive
Ludwik Fleck's (1896-1961) philosophical sociology of medical science,7
For his part, Heidegger's critical reflections on science anticipate the turn to
the history of science and indeed the social and historical studies of technology
that increasingly inform science studies,S Heidegger's reflective critique of math
ematics and science in his 1927 Being and Time, together with the questioning he
undertakes with regard to thinking the essence of modern technology, provides
the basis for his hermeneutic phenomenology ofboth scientific theory and prac
tice. As he writes in the later 1930s, using what would turn out to be a timely
example taken from the same experimental physics that would herald the devel
opment of the atom bomb in the mid-1940s, "Within the complex of machinery
that is necessary to physics in order to carry out the smashing of the atom lies
the whole of physics:'9
Heidegger's point is echoed in the argument Heelan makes in Quantum
Mechanics and Objectivity with respect to Heisenberg's perturbation theory
of measurement in his 1925-27 contributions to quantum mechanics. lo
Measurement, as Heelan points out with special emphasis on the technological
instruments that are used to obtain such measurements that is, what Heidegger
calls "the complex. of machinery" makes all the difference for the "new scien
tific spirit" using Bachelard's terminology of physics. I I For Heidegger,
what is at issue is the constitution of modern technological and mathematiz
able (measurable, calculable, model-oriented) science, conceived in both the
Husserlian phenomenological sense and the mechanically explicit sense of stan
dardized manufacture and institutional technology. 12 It is thus in this sense that
7. See Jerzy Giedymin, "Polish Philosophy in the Interwar Period and Ludwik Fleck's Theory of
Thought Styles and Thought Collectives;' in Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck,
Robert Cohen and Ludwig Schnelle (eds) (Boston, MA: Reidel, 1986), 184, for a comparison
of Fleck and Mach; and Friedrich Steinle, "Experiment, Concept Formation and the Limits
of Justification: 'Discovering' the Two Electricities;' in Revisiting Discovery and Justification,
Jutta Schickore and Friedrich Steinle (eds) (Frankfurt: Springer, 2006), 191.
*8. For a discussion of science studies, see the essay by Dorothea Olkowski in the History of
Continental Philosophy: Volume 8.
9. Martin Heidegger, "The Age of World Picture:' William Lovitt (trans.), in The Question
Concerning Technology (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 127. See too Paul Forman, "The
Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology in the
I-fistory of Technology:' History a/1d Technology 23( 1) (2007).
10. Heehm, Quantum lvlechal1ics and Objectivity, chs 4 and 5.
II. See Patrick A. Heelan, "Preface:' in Gaston Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, 1984) With reference to the laboratory embodiments of research, Heelan's
study of Heisenberg discusses Ernst Cassirer, Erwin Schr(idinger, and Eugene Wigner along
with Hanson.
12. See Dmitri Ginev, The Context o{Constitution: Beyond the
oj EpistcmoiogiCll/ Justificatiol1
(Dorurech t: Spri nger, 20(6) for an analysis of this concept in continen tal ph ilosophy nfscience.
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the Heidegger of the 1930s describes the trajectory of modern technology as a
"humanism;' much as Friedrich Nietzsche in The Gay Science and in his post
humous notes characterizes mathematics and the sciences in general as what he
named, in a Kantian voice, so many modalities of "humanization:'13

I. LIMIT-CONCEPTS, METHOD, AND

THE TENSIONS OF FRENCH PRAGMATISM

In his address in Paris to the 1900 World Congress of Mathematicians, David
Hilbert (1862-1943) adumbrated his famous programmatic plan for mathe
matics, articulating his positive conviction that "However unapproachable
these problems may seem to us and however helpless we stand before them,
we have, nevertheless, the firm conviction that their solution must follow by
a finite number of purely logical processes:'14 In 1930, Kurt Godel (1906-78)
would announce the results of his own research disproving Hilbert's program
at a congress on the epistemology of the exact sciences in Konigsberg at which
Hilbert himself gave the culminating public lecture of his life, publicly broadcast
on the radio, and proclaiming in conclusion "We must know - we will know:'15
One did not, however, have to wait for Godel. The crisis in the foundational
program is coterminous with Hilbert's project. It is already present in the neo
Kantianism that dominated continental thinking on science and mathematics
in all its modalities from the empirio-criticism or environmental positivism of
Richard Avenarius (1843-96) and Mach, in the logical positivism of the Vienna
Circle that emerged from this tradition, in Henri Poincare and Henri Bergson,
and in Husserl and Heidegger.
To the question of foundations must be added the question of method.
Heinrich Rickert's The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science (1896
1902) distinguishes the different traditions of science as such, and Wilhelm
Dilthey (1833-1911) extends this reflection to the human sciences. Inaugur
ating the then-influential turn to what was called Lebensphilosophie,16 Dilthey
13. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Siimtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Montinari (eds) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980) (hereafter KSA), vol. 11, 19l.
14. David Hilbert. "Mathematical Problems;' Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 8
(1902),445.
15. Contending that there is in mathematics no "Ignorabimus;' Hilbert refers to Emil du Bois
Reymond's (1818-96) claim that there are limits to human knowledge; see Victor Vinnikov,
"We Shall Know: Hilbert's Apology;' Mathematical Intelligencer 21 (1999).
16. Dilthey invokes the notion of limit -concepts in The Formation of the Historical World in the
Human Sciences. For a 1939 account, see Carl Theodore Glock, Wilhelm Diltheys Grundlegung
einer wissenschaftlichen Lebensphilosophie (Berlin: Junker und Diinnhaupt, 1939). On the
social and natural sciences. see Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Science and Discipline: Some Historical
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emphasized lived experience as central to the opposition between explanation
and understanding. The same focus on method can be read in the reflections of
social scientists such as Max Weber (1864-1920), as well as in the Existenz
philosophie of the physician turned philosopher, Karl Jaspers (1883-1969).
Even Nietzsche emphasized that "the scientific spirit rests upon insight into
method:'17 a claim that included classical philology and history as well as the
physical sciences. 18 Yet Nietzsche also argued that "the triumph of science
distinguishes our 19th century less than does the triumph of scientific method
over science."19 Although there were clear differences between them, Nietzsche
shared Mach's emphasis on the role of error in scientific rationality along with
Mach's opposition to atomism. 2o Indeed, one commentator's introductory assess
ment of the general reaction to Mach in this context should be compared to
common responses to the conjunction of Nietzsche and science: "Mach's view
point provides a basis only for destructive criticism, and tends to discourage the
development of hypotheses that may turn out to be fruitfuI:'21
It is Nietzsche's critical thinking on the sciences and on logic and mathe
matics, conjoined with his influence on certain scientists and mathematicians,
that constitutes one of the earliest instantiations of continental philosophy
of science. During the period under discussion here, Nietzsche's cnhcai

17.

18.
19.

20,

21.

and Critical Reflections;' in Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education, Joseph J. Kockelmans
(ed.) (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979) and Charles Bambach,
Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, §635, in KSA, voL 2, 360-61; cf. ibid., §278, 228-9. On
Nietzsche and method, see my '''The Problem ofScience' in Nietzsche and Heidegger;' Revista
Portuguesa de Filosofia 63 (2007).
Nietzsche, On the Use and Disadvantage of History, §7, in KSA, voL 1,295.
Nietzsche, KSA, vol. 13, 442. The same question of method later animates Paul Feyerabend,
but although there are parallels - see Gordon Beam, "Nietzsche, Feyerabend, and the Voices
of Relativism," Metaphilosophy 17(2-3) (1986), as well as my Nietzsche's Philosophy ofScience:
Reflecting Science on the Ground ofArt and Life (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 48tf, and,
more broadly, AngeIe Kremer-Marietti, Seven Epistemological Essays (Paris: Buenos Books
America, 2007) Feyerabend himself disclaimed any influence. On the 19305 background
to the deep complexities of such influence see Val Dusek, "Brecht and Lukacs as Teachers of
feyerabend and Lakatos: '[he Feyerabend-Lakatos Debate as Scientific Recapitulation of the
Brecht-Lukacs Debate," History of the Human Sciences 11 (2) (1998).
Hans Kleinpeter emphasizes the connection with Mach in DcI' Phiillomenalisl11us: Eine natur
wissellscl1(~ftlichc Weltanschauung (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1913), 226ft'., citing his
1912 cssay on Nietzsche's epistemology. Mach also shared Nietzsche's radical skepticism, as
Carl hiedrich von Weizsacker notes in "Nietzsche: Perceptions of Modernity:' in Nietzsche,
Epistemology, and Philosophy ofScience, B. Babich and R. S. Cohen (cds) (Dordrecht: Springer,
1999), 227. See too Renate Reschke, Dellkumbrilche mit Nietzsche: ZliI' ampornellden
Verarhtul1g da Zeit (Berlin: Akademie, 2(00), 187ft'., and my "Mach, [)uhem, Bachelard:' in
Twentieth-Century Continental Philo50phy, Richard Kearney (ed.) (London: Routledge, I
Stephen Brush, "1\1ach and Atomism;' Synthese 18 (J %8), 192.
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philosophical spirit, including his theory of eternal recurrence,22 influences
not only literary and artistic traditions but also philosophical discussions of
Darwinism, the debate on entropy and thermodynamics,23 and the tradition of
Victorian relativity antedating Einstein, even if we set aside, for the moment,
the impact of Nietzsche's thinking on Heidegger's early philosophy of science.
Highlighting Nietzsche's practical emphases together with his skepticism, the
Belgian philosopher Rene Berthelot in 1911 coordinates American pragmatist
and continental philosophy of science, comparing Nietzsche not only to the
pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James but also to Poincare. 24
Linking the American pragmatists in this way with the work of scientists is no
fluke. In fact, it is difficult to parse French philosophers of science during this
period without referring to Peirce and, especially, to James, who was familiar
with and shared a number of interests with Bergson. 25 Bergson began his intel
lectuallife with a prize essay in mathematics, and in addition to his reflections
on evolution he contributed also to the philosophy of mathematics inasmuch as
he undertook the critically important step at the turn of the twentieth century of
~22.

For a discussion of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, see the essay on Nietzsche by Daniel
Conway in The History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 2.
23. Drawing on Henri Poincare's argument that a closed system of atoms must recur, in an
infinitesimal approximation, to its initial state, infinitely many times, von Weizsacker notes
that Ernst "Zermelo in 1900 raised objection to the statistical interpretations of the second
law of thermodynamics, the so-called Recurrence Objection" ("Nietzsche: Perceptions of
Modernity:' 227). This objection against entropy seemed to provide support for Nietzsche's
and other theories of recurrence. For a discussion, including references to Nietzsche and
Poincare, see Stephen Brush, The Temperature ofHistory: Phases of Science and Culture in the
Nineteenth Century (New York: Bart Franklin, 1978); more recently, Peter Erdi cites the same
tradition in Complexity Explained (Frankfurt: Springer, 2007). For an overview, including a
reference to Nietzsche, see Christopher Herbert on the tradition of relativity before Einstein
in Victorian Relativity: Radical Thought and Scientific Discovery (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 2001).
24. See Rene Berthelot, Un Romantisme utilitaire: Etude sur Ie mouvement pragmatiste. 1, Le prag
matisme chez Nietzsche et chez Poincare (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1911). Peirce, it should be noted,
was not pleased with this comparison.
25. See Henri Bergson, "On the Pragmatism of William James: Truth and Reality:' Melissa
McMahon (trans.), in Key Writings, Keith Ansell-Pearson and John Mullarkey (eds) (New
York: Continuum, 2002) as well as Emile Boutroux's WillialJl Jallles, Archibald Henderson and
Barbara Henderson (trans.) (New York: Longman's, Green, 19J 2), Horace Kallen's William
James and Henri Bergson: A Study in Contrasting 'Iheorics
LUt; (Chi<..'ago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1914) begins by focusing on the perct'ptual contrast between, and hence
allinity of, the artist and the philosopher. It should not be supposed, however, that French
philosophers of the turn of the century read the American pragmatists in the way they are
read IOday, a difference still evident, for example, in PaullZicoeur's Freedom lI/1d Nature: 7he
I/olulltary and the Involuntary, Erazim Kohak (trans.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1966)' where, in addition to a discussion of James and eidet ic
Ricoeur
also compares James with Bergson and Jaspers.
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"rereading both Kant's philosophy and Riemann's mathematics of the manifold
and gave the term intuition a central place in his reasoning:'26

II. THE MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE:
HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY

Contemporary analytic philosophy of science rests, implicitly or explicitly, on
the crucial idea of the "scientific revolution': In this same tradition of philos
ophy of science, it is well known that Pierre Duhem's famous theoretical under
determinism was influential for Einstein and Quine. 27 What is less well known
is that Duhem also wrote a key account of the story of Catholic (and Islamic and
Jewish 28 ) science in the Middle Ages - the ten-volume Le Systeme du monde 
undermining nothing less threatening to modern science's conception of itself (in
contrast with the medieval and ancient worlds 29 ) than the very idea of the scien
tific revolution. Most historians and philosophers of science are hard pressed to
fit the conceptual traditions of medieval science into the developmental tradition
of modern science,30 and ancient science presents an even more difficult task.
26. Julian Rohrhuber, "Intuitions!Anschaungen;' Faits divers 1 (2007), 2. As Jean Milet notes,
in Bergson et Ie ca/cul infinitesimal: Ou, la raison et Ie temps (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1974), while widely celebrated in many fields in the early part of the twentieth century,
Bergson came to be denounced with rhetorically savage criticism, as some raised what Milet
regards as baseless claims challenging Bergson's mathematical proficiency. In contrast, Gaston
Bachelard's reflections on science were widely appreciated, perhaps because of his enthusiasm
for subordinating "empirical diversity to the power of reason," as Bernadette Bensaud~ Vincent
insightfully puts it in her discussion of Bachelard and chemistry, "Chemistry in the French
Tradition of Philosophy of Science: Duhem, Meyerson, Metzger and Bachelard;' Studies in
History and Philosophy o.fScience Part A 36(4} (December 2005),633.
27. Don Howard, "Einstein and Duhem;' Synthese 83(3) (June 1990).
28. See e.g. Gad Freudenthal, "Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed and the Transmission of
the Mathematical Tract 'On the Asymptotic Lines' in the Arabic, Latin, Hebrew Medieval
Tradition," VivariUl1'! 26 (1988); Max Lejbowicz, "Pierre Duhem et !'histoire des sciences
arabes;' Revue des questions scientifiques 175( 1) (2004); F. Jamil Ragep, "Duhem, The Arabs,
and the History of Cosmology;' Synthese 83 (1990); and David B. Ruderman, Jewish 'J/umght
and SCientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (New Haven, CT· Yale University Press, 1995).
29. Paul Feyerabend, Science in 17 hee Society (London: Verso, 1978), 33ff., is both wry and
unparalleled on philosophy of science and history of science. On the reciprocal exdu~
sions of the history of science and philosophy of science, see John R. Wetterstein, "1he
Philosophy of Science and the History of Science: Separate Domains vs. Separate Aspects,"
771!' Philosophical Fon/111 14(1) (fall 1982), and Klaus I-Ientschel, "Der Vergleich a!s Bri.icke
zwischen Wissenschallsgeschichte und \VissenschaJ1.stlworie;' jOllrnalj(Jr Geneml Philosophy
o(ScienLc 34 (2003)

30. But see, generally, Edward Grant, "{he FoundlltiOlls oflvlodern Sciaw: in the Middle Ages: "fheir
Religiolls, IIISltluliol/lI! und Intellectllill COlltexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
19% ).
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On the subject matter of ancient science, and challenging the ongoing
presumption that supp0ses Aristotle incapable of observation, Paul Feyerabend
reminds us of the stubbornly acontextual tendencies of the Vienna Circle. 3l
In accord with Duhem's continuationist point vis-a.-vis the scientific revolu
tion, Feyerabend argues that the "Vienna Circle shares with the enlightenment
an exaggerated faith in the powers of reason and an almost total ignorance
concerning past achievements:'32 Like Nietzsche before him, Feyerabend calls
for greater historical sensitivity, a hermeneutic attention to context that would
increase the rigor of scientific historiography.
Duhem's 1903 discovery of themes from Leonardo's notebooks in a medi
eval manuscript (of one Jordanus Nemorarius) exemplifies this point. 33 As one
scholar notes, so far "from seeing Leonardo as the forerunner of modern science,
Duhem fairly rooted him in the then-hitherto unexplored context oflate medi
eval scholastic thoughf'34 Using a metaphor borrowed from Nietzsche to speak
of the Greeks' unique discoveries,35 Ernst Cassirer has drawn our attention to the
detail of Duhem's account of "how Leonardo received a great number of prob
lems immediately from the hands of Cusanus and how he took them up precisely
at the pOint Cusanus had left them:'36 As Duhem further details, Domingo de
Soto (1494-1570) had described free fall eighty years before Galileo in his
1551 commentary on Aristotle's Physics. 37 Duhem's approach became the basis
for an important change in the history of science. As Jeanne Peiffer explains,
"Duhem explOited long-neglected sources and enlarged the body of knowledge
concerned with scholastic mathematics and philosophy. He defended the thesis
that, through an uninterrupted sequence of barely perceptible improvements,
modern science arose from doctrines taught in the medieval schools."38
Together with a focus on interpretation and context, hermeneutic and
phenomenological philosophy of science also attends to the kind of historical
31. Here Feyerabend repudiates "the historical illiteracy of most contemporary philosophers and
of their low standards of hero worship" (Science in a Free Society, 59).
32. Ibid.
33. See Duhem's three-volume study Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci: Ceux qu'il a ius et ceux qui l'ont
lu (Paris: A. Herman 11, 19(6).
34. A. Richard Turner, Inventing Leonardo (New York: Knopf, 1992), 141.
35. !\ietzsche, KSA, vol. 1,804.
36. Ernst
the Individual iJ1ui the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, Mario Domandi
(trans.) (New York: Dover, 20(0), 50; see also Lynn Thorndike, History
Magic and
Experimental Science (New York: Columbia UniverSity Press, 1941).
37. See on this, among many others, \Nilliam Wallace, "lJuhem and Koyrt~ Oil Domingo de SOlO,"~
Synthese 83(2) (1990).
38. jeanne Peitier. "France:' in Writing the History of" i'vialhel1llltics, Joseph W. Daubcl1 and
Christoph J. ScribJ (eds) (Basel: Birkhiiuser, 20(2), 30. Feyerabcnd invokes Duhcm to argue
thal "logic was on the side of .. Bellarmine ... not Calileo" (hlrt'well 10 Reason I London:
Verso, 1989], 134).

or
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specificity or perspective emphasized by Herbert Butterfield, as does Nietzsche,
and later still Foucault and Georges Canguilhem. 39 Mainstream history of science
by contrast continues to tend toward "leaving things out;'40 perhaps in the interest
of minimizing complexity, which may be why it prefers the more neutral "presen
tist" to Butterfield's "whig" terminology. But the language of "presentism" exem
plifies the problem of presentism. Thus Butterfield argues that:
behind the Whig interpretation - the theory that we study the past
for the sake of the present - is one that is really introduced for the
purpose of facilitating the abridgment of history; and its effect is
to proVide us with a handy rule of thumb by which we can easily
discover what was important in the past, for the simple reason that,
by definition, we mean what is important "from our point of view:'41

III. BEYOND PHYSICS: EXEMPLARS OF SCIENCE

(i) Grounding physical science: geology and deep time
a science typically neglected in mainstream discussions of the philosophy of
scienceY Like evolution and paleontology, geology counts as a "palaetiological"
science in William Whewell's language that has had a correspondingly diverse
range of influences, not least in the mid-nineteenth century via Charles Lyell's
influence on DarwinY The Scottish physicist William Thomson (I824-1907),
who later became Lord Kelvin, challenged the Hytton-Lyell "uniformitarian"
theory of geology44 in the 1860s. Although his challenge to uniformitarian
*39. For a discussion of Foucault and Canguilhem in this regard, see the essay by Pierre Cassou
40.

41.

42.

43.

Nogues in The History ofContinental Philosophy: Volume 4.
Palle Yourgrau uses this expression to characterize the exclusion of Godel from the philosophy
of physics in A World Without Time: The Forgotten Legacy of Gadei and Einstein (New York:
Basic Books, 2005), 24. See also the discussion below.
Herbert Buttert1eld, ] he Whig Interpretation of History (New York: Norton, 1931).
'The paleontologist and geologist Karl Alfred von Zittel (1839-1904) authored a compre
hensive overview of both sciences in Geschichte der Geologic und Paliiontologie his Ende des
19. Jahrhlmdert. See too Peter J. Bowler, "The Whig Interpretation of Geology;' Biolugy (ll1d
Philosophy 3 (1988) and Rachel Laudan, From Mineralogy to Geology: The Foundations of a
Science, I 650~ 1830 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
See Roy Porter, "Charles Lyell and the Principles of the History of Geology:' British Journal

for the History o/Sciellcc 9(32) (l976).
44. 'lhe uniformitarian theory of geology, as the name suggests, ass limes the constallcy of the
earth's relative position in the solar system and the stability of the geological features of the
earth itself over long periods of time.
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theories of the age of the earth was well founded, Lord Kelvin's own simple or
"elegant" mathematical model failed to represent the complex dynamics of the
earth's geological evolution (and indeed its present), and hence his estimate
of the age of the earth, for all its mathematical "correctness;' was nonetheless
erroneous. 45 Incorporated in the second law of thermodynamics as expressed
in 1865 by Rudolf Clausius (1822-88), Thomson's challenge, although not itself
productive for geology per se, was enormously influential and culminated in the
concept of entropy, one of the most profoundly philosophical scientific notions
of the nineteenth century. This vision in turn inspired Poincare's recurrence
theorem, which stated that in a closed or bounded system all events return, infi
nitely many times, to their initial state, much as Nietzsche also argued with his
own theory of the eternal recurrence of the same. 46 In the spirit of "deep time;'
both Poincare's and Nietzsche's articulations highlight an already-consummate
past.
Beyond its nineteenth -century preludes and in addition to thermodynamics
and evolution, geology saw further important innovations in the polar explorer
and geologist Alfred Lothar Wegener's (1880-1930) 1912 theory of continental
driftY Quintessentially revolutionary, Wegener's discovery dramatizes some
of the difficulties of paradigm change, as it was ridiculed for nearly fifty years
(indeed, it was still the object of ridicule by professors of earth science when
this author was at university) before being finally accepted as today relevant
for the sciences of ecology, evolution, and climate change. Wegener is thus a
paradigmatic example for the obstacles faced by any revolutionary theory.48
Both for theoretical as well as contextually hermeneutic reasons, including the

45. See, for a discussion, in a context attuned to both geology and mathematical modeling in
science, Orrin H. Pilkey and Linda Pilkey Jarvis, Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental
Scientists Can't Predict the Future (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 27ff.
46. For a discussion of the nineteenth-century context, relevant to Poincare as well as Nietzsche,
see Brush, Ihe Temperature of History, as well as Milic Capek, The Philosophical Impact
of Contemporary Physics (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1961). For a discussion of
Poincare, see the first part of Barry Gower, "Cassirer, Schlick, and 'Structural' Realism: The
Philosophy of the Exact Sciences in the Background to Early Logical Empiricism;' British
Journal for the History
Philosophy 8( I) (2000), esp. 80-86, as well as Erdi, Complexity
Explained. See also Eli Zahar, Poincare's Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology
(La Salle, I L: Open Court, 200 I), esp. ch. 4.
47. Alfred Wegener, "Die Entstehung der Kontincnte," Geologische Rtmdscil,m 3 (1912).
48. In addition to Ronald Giere's central discussion of Wegener and revolution in geology in
Explaining Science (Chicago, JL: University of Chicago Press, 1988). ch. 8, see Homer Eugene
LeGrand, Drifting COtltillel1/s and Shifting 'Iheories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989).37-54, as well as, v.-ith specific reference to philosophy of science, Carol E. Cleland,
"Methodological and Episkmic Differences between Historical Science and Experimental
Science," Philosophy o/Sciencc 69 (September 20(2).
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development of nuclear weapons,49 but also given new interest in environ
mental philosophy, geology continues to be relevant for continental philosophy
of science to this day. 50
(ii) Chemistry contra physics

Like the reductionist tendency to translate continental philosophy into analytic
philosophy, all other sciences are thought, at least in theory, to be amenable to
a translation into the terms of physicS. This presupposition is inherently prob
lematic in chemistry, even though chemistry, unlike biology or psychology, can
appear to be the most physics-like of the nonphysics natural sciences. This pOint
is exemplified by the writings of a chemist whose work is increasingly relevant
in the philosophy of chemistry today, Friedrich Adolf Paneth (1887-1958).51

49. The science of geology is essential to detecting covert nuclear tests. See John Cloud, "Imaging
the World in a Barrel: CORONA and the Clandestine Convergence of the Earth Sciences;'
Social Studies of Science 31 (2) (2001), and Paul Forman, "Kausalitiit, Anschaulichkeit, and
Indivir1l1aiitiit, or How Cultural Values Prescribed the Character and the Lessons Ascribed to
Quantum Mechanics;' in Society and Knowledge: Contemporary Perspectives in the Sociology
of Knowledge, Nico Stehr and Volker Meja (eds) (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books,
1984). But also see Kai-Henrik Barth, "The Politics of Seismology;' Social Studies of Science
33(5) (2003).
50. See Michael Aaron Dennis, "Earthly Matters: On the Cold War and the Earth Sciences;' Social
Studies ofScience 33(5) (2003). For continental philosophies of geology, see Robert Frodeman,
Geo-Logic: Breaking Ground between Philosophy and the Earth Sciences (Albany, NY: SUNY
Press, 2003) and lhomas Raab and Robert Frodeman, "What is it Like to be a Geologist? A
Phenomenology of Geology and its Epistemological Implications;' Philosophy and Geography
5(1) (2002).
51. See Eric Scerri, The Periodic lable: Its Story and its Significance (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006) for a discussion of the conceptual and theoretical implications of Paneth's work
for the philosophy of chemistry. Although the discussion to follow will highlight Paneth's
work, we have already cited several chemists) notably Bachelard but also Duhem and
Berthelot. To these names, Bensaud- Vincent adds Emile Meyerson (1859-1933), who began
his career as a German trained chemist, and Helene Metzger (1889··1944) ("Chemistry in the
French Tradition;' 634·5). For Bensaud- Vincent, the considerations of feminist philosophy
and history of science are indispensable because philosophers and historians of science tend
to overlook otherwise significant scientific work owing to a double prejudice against women
that extends to those who lack the "prestigious diplomas" and not less (and this is the contrast
as Bensaud- Vincent notes with Myerson) the crucial academic appointments that make all the
difference for scholarly recognition (ibid., 644). To Metzger's name in chemistry may be added
in phYSics the name of Mileva Maric or Marit), (1875-1948), Albert Einstem's Ii rst wife and
his mathematical and scienti!ic collaborator, controversially listed as the coauthor of his 1905
"Zur E!ektrodyn<lmik bewegter Kiirper:' received by the SWISS journal Annalell dcr Physik on
June 30,1905, signed Einstein-Marity. Alberto Martinez argues the mainstreal11 view colilra
the signilicance of iVlileva Marity-Einstcin, but cites the Russian physicist Abram loffe's 1955
aCCollnt 111 "Handling Evidence in 11istory: The Case of Einstein's Wife," SelIOU/ '\(i(,lIc(' Rev/Cill
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As a scientist, Paneth is known for his work on isotopes, collaborating in
1921 on the use of radium D as a tracer with the Hungarian chemist George
de Hevesy {1885-1966).52 Paneth is also well known for theorizing the natural
scientific limit-concept of the chemical element as such. Paneth underlines the
dangers of the reductionist tradition of representing chemistry on the model of
physics, writing that "As a rule, chemistry is presented by the philosophers as a
science which is well on the way to transforming itself into physics, and to which,
therefore, the same considerations will apply in due course:'53 But where Paneth
sought to make these points from the perspective of the philosophy of chem
istry in the 1930s, response, as Jaap van Brackel details, has been either utterly
absent or glacially slow in mainstream philosophy ofscience. Indeed, as Joachim
Schummer argues, the "one-sided picture of science tailored to physics"54 has
often meant that analytic philosophers of science are unaware of the philosophy
of chemistry in terms of the specific differences between chemistry and physics
rather in the way they are generally unaware of the philosophy of biology or the
philosophy of economics in spite of the important work of continental scientists
and theorists such as Friedrich von Hayek and Michael Polanyi,55
Duhem, himself a physical chemist, would emphasize the exceptionality of
chemistry in the same way, pointing to Kant's observation that "the theory of
bodies can only become a science of nature when mathematics is applied to
it."56 The point of drawing a parallel with chemistry (like other sciences such as
geology, as noted above) has been to underline the fact that analytic philosophers

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

86(316) (March 2005),51-2. Inasmuch as the original manuscript has vanished, no resolu
tion is in fact possible.
Hevesy, an independent researcher, won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1943 for work that
grew out of this earlier collaboration with Paneth. Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was Hevesy's
assistant in Budapest in 1919 before returning to Germany where he had studied physical
chemistry.
See Friedrich A. Paneth, "The Epistemological Status of the Chemical Concept of Element;'
Foundations of Chemistry 5 (2003), 114. See Eric Scerri, "Realism, Reduction and the
'Intermediate Position;' in OfMinds and Molecules, Nalini Bhushan and Stuart M. Rosenfeld
(eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) as well as Scerri, "Normative and Descriptive
Philosophy of Science and the Role of Chemistry:' in Philosophy of Chemistry: Synthesis of a
New Discipline, David Baird et al. (cds) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006).
Joachim Schummer, "The PhIlosophy of Chemistry," Endeavor 27(1) (2003),37. See further
Christoph Liegener and Giuseppe Del Re, "Chemistry versus PhYSics, the Reduction Myth,
and the Unity of Science," Zeitschri(t fur allgemeine Wissenschaftsthcorie ]8 (1987), as well
as, for an instructively comprehensive account, Jaap Vall Brakel, "On the Neglect of the
Philosophy of Chemistry:' Poundations of Chemistry 1 (1999).
For a discussion of Hayek's (1899~ 1992) and Polanyi's philosophies of science, see Peter
Medawar, 'The Art ofthe Soluble (London: Methuen, 1967) and Philip Mirowski, The Effortless
Economy of Science (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
Pierre Duhem, Geuwl1l Science: Some Reflections on German Science ilnd German Virtul's,
r. Lyon (trans.) (La Salle, It: Open COllrt, 199]),31. Duhem goes on to cite Adolphe Wurtz,

274

EARLY CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

in
'ge
ral
he
of
a
1,

h

of science ignore both chemistry and the philosophy of chemistry rather in the
way continental philosophy of science is similarly discounted.
But the parallel runs deeper. Paneth's own work is itself steeped in the early
continental tradition of the philosophy of science. Thus Paneth's theoretical
reflections on the nature of the chemical element cannot be read apart from his
engagement with the epistemological reflections of Rickert's limit -concepts or
the philosopher Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), or Meyerson's own chem
ical inSights or Polanyi's, or of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), the father of experi
mental psychology so important for cognitive science. Additional influences on
Paneth's thinking include the theoretical inSights of Hermann Weyl (1885-1955)
and the physicalist and phenomenological reflections of the 1902 Nobel prize
winning chemist Emil Fischer (1852-1919).
In his "On the Epistemological Status of the Chemical Concept of Element;'
Paneth repudiates the reduction of chemistry to physics for the very phenom
enological and critical reason that the aim of physics is ultimately to reduce
"sensory qualities to quantitative determinations:'57 Like Duhem, Paneth cites
Kant's mathematical conventionality as justifying the exclusion of chemistry
as a science. By contrast, Paneth argues that inasmuch as "chemistry is essen
tially non-mathematical;'58 it was the "chemlst, unhampered by mathemaiIcs
or indeed almost any theory, who discovered the majority of all chemical
elements on the basis of the most primitive concept of substance!"59 The effec
tively unchanged basis of chemistry, that is, the basic schema of the periodic
table itself in the wake of relativity and quantum theory, offers a corroboration,
as Paneth underscores: "already in the seventies of the last century, the elements
had been arranged by the chemists into a scheme, the so-called 'natural system
of the elements"'60 a system thus unchanged in its character by the innovations
of twentieth-century atomic theory.

Dictiomzaire de chimie: Pure et appliquee (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1874): "Chemistry is a
French science:'
57. Paneth, "The Epistemological Status," 16.
51\. Ibid., 118. In a related but ultimately different point, some philosophers of science have argued
that the difference between chemists and physicists can be found ill the central role of the
"thought experiment" in physics just where it is conspicuously absent in chemistry.
59. Ibid., emphasis added. See Jaap Van Brake!, "Chemistry as the Science of the Transformation
of Substances," Synthese III (1997).
60. Scerri notes that the French geologist Alexandre-f~mile Beguyer de Chancourtois (I 820~
86) was the first to propose a periodic arrangement of the elements according to atomic
weights. Ot hers include the I:nglish chemist John Alexander Reina Newlands (1837-98)
and the German chemist Julius Lothar Meyer (1830-95) in addition to Dmitri tv1cndeleev
( I 1:\34 19(7). MenJeJeev is celebrated as the first to use the table to predict elements as yet
undiscovered.
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Speaking here of substance as either basic (nonobservable, theoretical, or,
in some philosophic expressions, constructed) or simple (observable), Paneth
seeks to explain the notion of an element as such: "the whole body of chemical
theory lies in the assumption that the substances which produce the phenom
enon of 'simple substances' serve in the quality-less, objectively real sphere of
nature as 'basic substances:'>61 Rather than progressing toward a more mathema
tized chemical science on the model of physics, one would do well to return to
the philosophical origins of the concept of the "elemental" (and Paneth means
such a return in earnest as he invokes the ancient atomists but also the Epicurean
notion of "mixing"); in order to avoid the dangers ofequivocation when speaking
of either the permanence of substance as such or the signal chemical and even
alchemical achievement that is the "creation of a new substance by mixing two
known ones:'62
In other words, chemical synthesis generates new compounds, and what we
understand by "substance" (here regarded as much philosophically as scientifi
cally) matters for a phenomenological understanding of such new compounds.
If Paneth refers to Karl Joel's 1906 allusion to the "genesis of nature philos
ophy in the spirit of mysticism;'63 Bensaud-Vincent reminds us that "the chal
lenge posed by chemistry is that its IrratIOnals are incorporated in matter: they
are everywhere, in a glass of sugared water or in the kitchen salt that we use
every daY:'64

61. Paneth, "The Epistemological Status," l30. For a discussion of the difference between
Paneth's transcendental approach and Frantisek Wald's Machian phenomenalism, see Klaus
Ruthenberg, "Chemistry Without Atoms;' in Stuff: The Nature of Chemical Substances, Klaus
Ruthenberg and Jaap van Brakel (eds) (Wurzburg: Konigshausen & Neuman, 2008).
62. Paneth, "The Epistemological Status;' 123. Bensaud~ Vincent cites Duhem's discussion of the
very idea of a new chemical compound by way of his revival of the Aristotelian term "mixt"
and other related concepts contra "the prevailing atomist and mechanistic views" ("Chemistry
in the French Tradition;' 637). Thus Duhem, in Le lvlixte et La combinaison chimique, argues
that in "this mixt, the elements no longer have any actual existence. They exist there only
potentially because on destruction the mixt can regenerate them" (cited in Bensaud··Vincent,
"Chemistry in the French Tradition:' 637).
63. Paneth, "The Epistemological Status," 24.
64. Bensaud- Vicent, "Chemistry in the French Tradition," 646. The distinction between physics
and chemistry, a political order of rank, seems to have made all the political, theoretical
difference for the scientific estimation and investigation of the first reports of cold fusion
inasmuch as these reports wae made by scientists who happened to be not physicists but
science continues to regard cold fusion as an example
chemists. Mainstream philosophy
either of pseudo-science or straightforward fraud. See kan~Palll Siberian, "Condensed Malter
Nuclear Science (Cold Fusion): An Update," llllcrlwtiollal Journal 0( Nuclear Energy Science
and Technology 3(!) (2007)

or
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IV. THE THINGS THEMSELVES: HUSSERL'S
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

We have noted that Husserl's philosophy of science must be set into the wider
scope of Hilbert's foundational program. For Husserl, this is the concern of
philosophy as a rigorous science but that is only inasmuch as philosophy is
concerned with truth (and not only with what is upheld as what is as good as
truth).65 Indeed, Husserl was associated with nearly every key mathematician of
the day, from Georg Cantor (1845-1918), Husserl's friend and colleague at the
University of Halle between 1890 and 1910,66 and Gottlob Frege to Hilbert, Weyl,
L. E. J. Brouwer, and G6de1. 67 For this reason, Husserl's Philosophy ofArithmetic,
which first appeared in 1891, is key to the period of continental philosophy of
science under discussion. 68 Heelan uses both Husserl's and Heidegger's reflec
tions to develop a philosophical reflection on objectivity, particularly in Niels
Bohr's and Heisenberg's theoretical interpretations, thereby suggesting that
phenomenology offers an indispensable route to a clarification of quantum
mechanics. Others have highlighted Einstein's role in Husserl's philosophy of
science, while yet others emphasize the coordination of Poincare with Husserl's

65. See, however, on 11usserl and pragmatism, the work of Richard Cobb-Stevens and others.
66. It has been argued that Cantor was an i!!1Portantinfluence on Husser!; see Clair Ortiz Hill,
"Did Georg Cantor Influence Edmund Husserl?" Synthese 113 (1997) and David Woodruff
Smith, "What is 'Logical' in Hussed's Logical Investigations? The Copenhagen Interpreta
tion;' in One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: HU5ser/'s Logicallnvestigatiorls Revisited, Dan
Zahavi and Frederik Stjernfelt (eds) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002). But see also David Bell, "A
Brentanian Philosophy of Arithmetic;' Brentano Studien: lnternationales Jahrbuch der Franz
Brentano Forschung 2 (1989), who argues that Husser! was principally influenced by Brentano.
Alain Badiou likewise alludes to this influence with his own claim that Husser! reads Galilean
science on a par with (post-Cantor) set theory in Being and Event, Oliver Feltham (trans.)
(London: Continuum, 2005), 3.
67. Even Einstein is said to have been tempted to name his theory of relativity "lnvarianten
theorie;' in an explicit echo of Husserl's phenomenological method; see Richard Tieszen,
Phenomenology, Logic. and the Philosophy ofMathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2(05), 87.
68. In addition to Heelan's QuantUl1'l Mechanics and Objectivity (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1965) (which remains important for its emphasis on the crucial role of continental philoso
phers in their theoretical engagement with scientists, and thereby with Heelan's analysis of
the hermeneutics of natural science within the experimental practice of the sciences them
selves), and his Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, I
a book on, among other things, Husser! and the metries of vision
from Luncherg to Marl', see 1110111<15 Ryckman, The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in
1915·1925 (Oxford: OXfllrd U!1lversity Press, 2005) for an account attuned to the history o(
science (on Husserl and Weyl as well as Einstein, Schlick, Reichenbach, and Eddington); see
als(l TlC~zel1, Phenomenology, Lugic, ilnd the Philosophy of Mathematics (oIl1111sserl and eiidc:
as well as on Cantor <wd [\rOllwer, Heyting and Poincare).
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criticisms of logicism and formalism. 69 Where Ryckman and Clair Ortiz Hill
point to the decades Husserl spent in Halle (and the importance of Cantor),
Heelan highlights, as do others, the significance of Husserl's tenure in Gottingen
during the dynamic years of Hilbert's foundational program in mathematics. 7o
Echoing Rene Descartes's remark in his Discourse on Method, Einstein famously
quipped that we should attend to what scientists do, not to what they say. Richard
Tieszen thus commends the value of Husserl's "philosophy of mathematics" as it
bears witness to the attempt "to do justice to mathematics as it is actually given
and practiced."71 Such a coordinated reference to the history and practice of
science exemplifies both phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches to the
philosophy of science, and we have seen its relevance for Nietzsche. In this spirit,
Ryckman can refer to Husserl's claim to be the "true positivist:'72 a claim that
Steven Crowell likewise cites as being "only" slightly ironic?3
For Descartes, as for the entire Enlightenment order of philosophizing about
cognition and perception, what the mind knows is mind. Thought must be
submitted to logical analysis to gain any sure knowledge of it, which leaves the
gap between mind and world, thought and object. What Eugene Wigner (1902
-95) would describe in a later recollection of this early period, and with patent
reference to both Hilben and Godel, as the "unreasonable effeciiveIles~" uf math
ematics in the natural sciences reflects a number of theoretically (if not to be
sure "effectively" or "practically") unbridgeable chasms. While this is the tradi
tional issue of objective versus subjective logic for both Husserl and Heidegger,
Husserl's account of intentionality sidesteps just this separation insofar as "the
69. Ryckman, The Reign ofRelativity, argues that Husser!, via Weyt, was an influence on Einstein.
In addition to Tieszen, Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy ofMathematics, for a discus
sion of Brouwer and Weyl in this particular context, see Gunther Neumann, Die pharlOmenol
ogische Frage nach dem Ursprung der mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen RaumaujJassung
be; Husser! und Heidegger (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999),23-33. In this same connec
tion, see Zahar, Poincare's Philosophy, 216ff. Indeed, Zahar argues that Husserl's notion of
intentionality clarifies Poincare's "constructivist yet anti-psychologistic conception of the
foundations of mathematics" (ibid., 206).
70. See Patrick A. Heelan, "Husserl, Hilbert and the Critique of Galilean Science;' in Edmund
Husser! and the Phenomenological Tradition, R. Sokolowski (ed.) (Washington, DC: The
Catholic UniverSity of America Press, 1988) and Philip Buckley, "Busserl's Gi:ittingen Years
and the Genesis of a Theory of Community:' in Reintr'rpreting th!! Political, Lenore Langsdorf
et al. (eds) (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998). See also Martin
"Hermeneutics as an
Approach to Science, Parts I and II," SCIence and Educlltion 2 (l993). 'fhe same viewpoint
recurs in Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns o{ Discovery: An Inquiry lIlto the Conceptual
Foundations of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195H), a parallel lieelan
traces in Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity.
71. Tieszen, Phenomenology, Logic, 50.
72. Ryckman, 'I1le Reign of Relativity, 15.

or

73. See Steven Galt Crowell, Husser!, Heidegger, I/fui the SpUC!!
llt1ealling: P(lths Towards
Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Norli1weslcrn University Press, 200 1),46.
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intentional object of a presentation is the same as its actual object:'74 What is
known by any intentional act is the intentional object or "noematic" correlate,
hence the directive direction of Husserl's classic cry: "zu den Sachen selbst" (to
the things themselves).75
Following the error of what Husserl calls "Galilean science" and Rickert had
named "positivist" science, the worldview of modern science inaugurates the
opposition between pragmaticism and realism that still stands for many as the
central problem of the philosophy of science today. Modern science limits or
reduces reality to its scientifically measurable, calculable, or quantifiable prop
erties, taking reality here in the common-sense (but still counter-intuitive)
meaning of scientific realism. As Husser! saw it, the technological, practical, and
theoretical mathematical projects articulating the essence of modern science are
fundamentally rather than incidentally opposed to one another. Galilean science
(Heidegger's calculative rationality) substitutes "the mathematically substructed
world of identities for the only real world;'76 and in this way, so Husserl suggests,
Galilean science itself comes to stand in the place of the world "that is actually
given through perception ... [that is,J our everyday life-world:'77
The Galilean distinction between primary and secondary properties privi
leges the measurable as primary, so that what began as a convenience led with
Descartes to the division of subjective experience (mind) and objective world
(body). And in the end, only the objective or measurable world became the real
world, with the subjective and leftover worlds of "meaning" and "value;' "mind"
or "spirit;' correspondingly eliminated or "reduced" to the domain of the unreal
as mere phenomena. As Husser! writes in The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, the scientific worldview "excluded in principle
precisely the questions which man, given over in our unhappy times to the
74. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, J. N. Findlay (trans.) (New York: Humanities Press,
1970), vol. 2, 595.
75. In this way, Husser! extended the concept of the life-world beyond its Romantic origins to
connect the worlds of science and mathematics to the world we inhabit, a project continued
in Heidegger's philosophical reflections on the world view of science and technology and
further revitalized and ultimately radicalized in Maurice Merleau-Ponty; see Heelan's discus
sion of Merleau- Ponty and Husser! in Space-Perception and the Philosophy ofScience, and for
a discussion of Merleau- Ponty and Derrida with respect to Husserl, see Leonard Lawlor, "The
Legacy of lIusserl's 'Urspnll1g der Geometrie': The Limits of Phenomenology in Merleau~ Ponty
and Dcrrida:' in J\ilerleml' POlity's l~eading of Husser!, Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (cds)
(Dordrccht: Kluwer, 2(03). florence Caeymaex also traces the connection between Mer1eau~
Ponty and Husser! via Bergson in her Sartrc, Merleau-Ponty. Bergson: Les Phcnol1lcno/')gies
existelltialistes el leur h,;ritage bergsonien (Hildesheim: Olms, 20(5).
76. Edmund Husserl, 'I he Cnsis 0/ European Sciolt'cs and Transcendental Phenomenology: All
Introduction to PIICtWIIlCIIO/ogicll/ Philosophy, David Carr (trans.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
UniverSIty Pre,s, J lJ7U). 4S-lJ.

/ /, Ibid.,

49.
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most portentous upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the meaning
or meaninglessness of the whole of this hard existence:'78 The greatest threat for
Husserl is thus the devaluation of consciousness, the loss of spirit or meaning.

v:.

HEIDEGGER: HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF SCIENCE

If, as Theodore Kisiel argues, "the Husserlian approach to science is strikingly
evident in the early pages of Being and Time:'79 Joseph J. Kockelmans (1923
2008) emphasizes that "in most of his publications Heidegger deals explicitly
with problems which pertain specifically to the realm of philosophy of science:'8o
Like Nietzsche, Heidegger argues that beyond theoretical reflection or scien
tific analysis, philosophy is an explicitly active questioning, especially so in the
case of the philosophy of science and modern technology. It is in terms of the
importance of reflection in philosophy that Heidegger argues that "all science
is perhaps only a servant with respect to philosophY:'BI The critical spirit of this
early account of the specific difference of philosophical reflection and scientific
theorizing finds its most famous expression in the later Heidegger's provocative
dictum "science does not think;'2;2 a claim thai l~ alreaJy 1.0 be heard iii his 1927
Being and Time: "ontological inquiry is more primordial or original than the
ontic inquiry of the positive sciences:'B3
Opposing sense-oriented reflection [Besinnung] to the calculative project of
Western technologically articulated and advancing science, Heidegger varies but
78. Ibid.
79. Theodore Kisiel, "Science, Phenomenology and the Thinking of Being:' in Phenomenology
and the Natural Sciences, Joseph J. Kockelmans and Theodore 1. Kisiel (eds) (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1970), 168. Kisiel here goes on to parallel Heidegger's Being
and Time with Husserl's Logical Investigations, where Heidegger characterizes science as "the
coherent totality of proofs which ground propositions" (ibid.).
80. Joseph 1. Kockelmans, "The Era of the World~as~Picture," in Kockelmans and Kisiel,
Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences, 184.
81. Martin Heidegger, Ihe Fundamental Concepts oj lvletaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude,
William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (trans.) (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1995), 5; Tieszen, Phenomenology, Logic, and thc Philosophy of Mathematics, emphaSizes the
importance for Godel of this emphasis on the role of philosophy, which Gode! shared with
both Husser! and Heidegger.
82. Martin Heidegger, What is Called Ihinklng? E D. Wieck and J. G. Gray (trans.) (New York:
Harper & Row, 1968), 8fr For discussion, see Dmitri Ginev, A Passage to the Idea for a
Hermeneutic' Philosophy of Sciencc (Amsterdam: Rouopi, 1997), as well as lhe contributions
to R. Babich (cd.), Hermeneutic Philosophy of Scicllce, VUIl Gogh:, Fyes, and God: Essays in
HOllOI' of Patrick A. Heelan, Sf (Dordrechl: KILlWer. 20(2), and Jeantvlichel Salanskis, "Die
Wissenschaft denkt nichl," 'f(>kllllema 2 (1995)
H3. Marlin Heidegger, Beil1g and Tillle, J..vlacquarrie and E. Robinson (trans.) (New York: Harper
& Row, 1(62), 11.
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he does not alter his early discussion of the relation between science and philos
ophy in Being and Time, writing that "all scientific thought is merely a derived
form of philosophical thinking:'84 With this claim, Heidegger maintains that
with respect to science, philosophy "is prior in rank:'85 In Being and Time, this
priority is characterized as a "productive logic"86 that leaps ahead "into some area
of Being, discloses it for the first time, in the constitution of its Being, and, after
thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these available to the positive
sciences as transparent assignments for their inquirY:'87 Heidegger thus opposes
the creatively foundational activity of philosophic reflection to the then popular
articulations of epistemological investigations into the sciences of his era as
the kind of "logic" (Heidegger sets this off in quotes) follOWing after science,
'''limping along in its wake: investigating the status of [any given] science as it
chances to find it in order to discover its 'method:"88
"What is decisive" for Heidegger - who here writes in Husserl's critical foun
dational spirit in the development of mathematical physics is "the mathematical
project of nature itself" inasmuch as the project "discovers in advance something
constantly objectively present (matter) and opens the horizon for the scientific
nersnedive on its clIlantitativelv definable moments (motion, force, location,
and time):'89 The "founding" of "factual science" is "possible only because the
researcher understood that there are in principle no 'bare facts;"90 that, in other
words, the material project of nature must be given in advance, a priori. Only
then is it possible for a science to be "capable of a crisis in its basic concepts:'91
Heidegger, who remained committed to phenomenology throughout his life,
emphasizes that beyond any superficially obvious call "to the things themselves;'92
phenomenology "presupposed life:'93 To understand Heidegger here requires
a specific and hermeneutic attention to the biological transformation that was
then under way. Including and exceeding Claude Bernard's milieu interieur, as
the evolution beyond Cartesian mechanism, Heidegger's reference was critically
ecological, radically environmental: "Life is that kind of reality which is in the
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84. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 26.
85. Ibid. For a reading of Heidegger's discussion of philosophy and science in the J 9305, see my
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91.
92,
93,

"Heideggers 'Beitriige' ZWIschen politische Kritik und die Frage nach der Technik;' Harald
Seubert (trans.), in Eugenik und dIe Zukunft, Stefan Sorgner et at. (eds) (Freiburg: Karl Alber,
2(06)
Heidegger, Being and Time, 30, cmphasis added.
Ibid., 31.
Ibid., translation modified.
Ibid., 362.
Ibid.
Ibid,,29.
Heideggt'r, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research," 160.
Ibid., 162,
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world and indeed in such a way that it has a world. Every living creature has its
environing world not as something extant next to it but as something that is there
[da ist] for it as disclosed, uncovered:'94 And in 1925, Heidegger emphasized that
"for a primitive animal, the world can be very simple;' explaining that we run
the risk of missing "the essential thing here if we don't see that the animal has a
world:'95 Heidegger's original continuum of complexity and/or simplicity must
be added to contemporary readings of Heidegger's subsequent discussions of the
world -poverty of the animal in terms of indigence.
In his 1929-30 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,
Heidegger alluded to the work of Hans Driesch (1867-1941), who theorized
chemical gradients in embryological development. 96 In that same course,
Heidegger also invokes the theoretical biologist Jakob von Uexkiill's (1864
1944) 1909 expression of the "Umwelt;' citing the Czech biologist Emanuel
Reidl (1873-1942) on the significance of animal phototropism 97 in order to
emphasize the gulf (Abgrund) between human and anima1,98 but also as a biol
ogistic contrast to the Cartesian tendency of modern scientific biology to define
both animals and human beings in mechanistic terms. This tendency remains
in modern experimental biology, underlying its reliance on "models;' specifi
cally in animai experimentation. 99 Here Heidegger reprises his hermeneutico
phenomenological case for the interpretive ontology of the human being as an
animal bound to world-invention, or what Heidegger called, in an ecological
modality, world-making. 1oo In this way, Heidegger had earlier cited Nietzsche's
perspectival sense of the human as the "yet to be finished animal:'lol It is in this
projective, that is, yet-unfinished but to-be-finished, sense that "The world that
is closest to us is one of practical concern. The environing world [Umwelt] and
its objects are in space, but the space of the world is not that of geometry."102
Historically, the mechanistic conception of life would return to triumph over
the notion of "vital movement" nascent in Driesch (although it is an error to
reduce Driesch's concerns to sheer vitalism, as is evident in his emphasis on
94. Ibid., 163.
95. Ibid.
96. Heidegger, the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 261 ff. Driesch published his theory of
organic development using the example of sea urchin development in 1894.
97. Ibid., 242ff, esp. 244.
98. Ibid., 264.
99. For a discussion of the epistemological implications of experimentation, see Shiv Visvanathan,
"On the Annals of the Laboratory State;' in Science, Hegemony, and Violence: A Requiem for
Modernity, Ashis Nandy (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). And for models and
complexity in environmental science, see, again, Pilkey and Pilkey- jarvis, Useless Arithmetic.
100. Ileidegger, 'j he Fundamental Concepts oj/Vlelapliysics, 274.
I (J 1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Lvii, sec. 62 (KSA, vol. 5, 81).
102. Heidegger, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research:' 163.
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electrochemical gradients), whereas Heidegger explored the living trajectory of
life as opposed to its "calculable" course. 103
Heidegger's focus on life also recurs in his reference to chemistry in 1929
in order to speak of the biological and organic sciences, to underline how little
is said about "the living being" when we "define it in terms of the organic as
opposed to the inorganic:'104 Echoing Nietzsche's contrastive differentiation of
reductively identical kinds in chemistry,I05 Heidegger reminds us to consider the
example of "organic and inorganic chemistry" precisely inasmuch as "organic
chemistry is anything but a science of the organic in the sense of the living being
as such. It is called organic chemistry precisely because the organic in the sense
of the living being remains inaccessible to it in principle:'lo6
Heidegger began Being and Time with a reference to the crisis in the sciences
and arguing for the importance of philosophical reflection. Each particular
science articulates its own regional ontology in terms of its basic constitution
(Grundverfassung),107 beginning with the example of the foundational contro
versy of mathematics in his (and still in our own) day, "between the formalists
and the intuitionists:'lo8 Thus Heidegger adds, in good Husserlian fashion, that
what is at stake in this debate turns on "obtaining and securing the primary
way of access to what are supposedly the objects"109 of mathematical science.
Heidegger articulates the same foundationai revoiution in physics as he invokes
the theory of relatiVity. This means that science begins with or alongSide its
own fundamental concepts, and inquiry into these foundations is not then a
matter of scientific research, for such research is possible only on the basis of
such concepts. Hence philosophical inquiry, or what Heidegger calls "ontolog
ical inquiry;' can only be «more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry
of the positive sciences:,j 10
For Heidegger, philosophy is, and can be, in Husserl's terminology, the science
of science not because of a venerable tradition of so regarding philosophy but

103. See Keith Ansell- Pearson, Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Con
dition (London: Routledge, 1997) for an innovative exploration of this theme with reference
to Bergson and others.
104. Heidegger, ?tIe Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 212.
105. Nietzsche repudiates the notion that there is "nothing unchanging in chemistry" as "a
scholastic prejudice. We have dragged in the unchanging, my physicist fricnds, deriving it
from metaphysics as always. To assert that diamond, graphite, and coal arc identical is to read
offthe facts naively from the surface. VVhy' Merely because no loss in substance can be shown
on the scales?" (KSA, Vlli. 13, 374).
106. Heidegger,Ihc FUl1ddmcnlal COl/cepts o(Metaphysics, 212.
107. Heidcgger. Heilig lind Time, 29.
lOS. lIJid., 30. Cf. 121···2.
109. Ibid.
I 10, [/lid, 31. Cf. ':) I .
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because specifically philosophical research must and "can;' as Heidegger claims,
"run ahead of the positive sciences:'lll Thus, as Heidegger clarifies this point, the
contribution of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason "lies in what it has contributed
towards the working out of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever:'l12 Rather
than epistemology, Kant's "transcendental logic is an a priori logic for the subject
matter of that region of Being called 'Nature:"113
In this productive, disclosing sense, which Heidegger also expresses as the
constitutional eventuality of aletheic truth as discovery or "uncovering;' the
scientist effectively opens up the truth of nature. In the aletheic context of such
a specifically scientific disclosure, it can be said that before "NeV\r1:on's laws were
discovered, they were not 'true:"114 By way of Dasein's "being in the truth;' 115 the
laws of NeV\rtonian physics only first "became true:' "NeV\rton's laws, the principle
of contradiction, any truth whatever - these are true only as long as Dasein is:'116
But to say this is also to say that through "NeV\rton the laws became true: and with
them entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been
uncovered, they show themselves as the entities which beforehand they already
were. Such uncovering is the kind of Being which belongs to 'truth."'l17

VI. GODEL: MATHEMATICS, TIME, AND THE COLLAPSE OF DIALOGUE

At the outset, we noted the importance of Hilbert's 1900 program to set math
ematics on the "completed" path of a science, expressed as Hilbert's "conviction
(which every mathematician shares, but which no one has as yet supported by
a proof) that every definite mathematical problem must necessarily be suscep
tible of an exact settlement:'118 And we have already noted that thirty years later,
Hilbert's conviction would be proven unfounded by a young mathematician
who initially thought himself to be taking up Hilbert's program. 119 As is already
evident in the title of Godel's 1931 first incompleteness theorem, "On Formally
Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems, "all
consistent formulations of such formal systems as number theory include
II L Ibid., 30.
112. Ibid., 31.
113. Ibid. See P. Kerzberg, Kllllt ct la nat1.ire (Paris: Les Belles- Lellre~. 1(99).
114. Heidegger, Being and Time, 269.
115. Ibid.
116. [bid.
117. Ibid., translation modi/led.
118. Hilbert, "Mathematical Problems," 444.
119. Although G()del and Hilbert never met (this is not ,urprislllg given the difference in
age ,md, indeed, pn.'stigt'), they were !lot uncoIllleclcd given (;(ldei's frIendship with Hilbert's
assistant, Paul Bernays (18ilil-1977).
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undecidable statements (unentscheidbare Siitze).120 As such, Godel's incom
pleteness theorem undermines Hilbert's ideal of axiomatic consummation. The
second incompleteness theorem states that the consistency of arithmetic cannot
be proved in arithmetic itself or on its own terms, using the methods of first
order predicate calculus. As Jean Cavailles (1903-44) has articulated Godel's
second theorem, "noncontradiction of a theory can be demonstrated only within
a more powerful theorY:'121 But this means that consistency can be proven only·
if the formal system is inconsistent, and insofar as one needs a higher-order or
more powerful system in order to prove consistency, this too falls short of the
foundationalist ideal of a complete axiomatic system.
The significance of G6del's work for mathematics and logic has been widely
acknowledged. As Cavailles 122 notes, the "result of Godel's work is well- known:
every theory containing the arithmetic of whole numbers is necessarily non
saturated. A proposition can be asserted within them which is neither the conse
quence of the axioms nor in contradiction with them:'123 Which is to say, no
formal system can be both consistent and complete. And beyond his engagement
with Hilbert and contributions to mathematics, there is also a case to be made
for the relevance of G6del's incompleteness theorem for Heisenberg's quantum
mechanics and the most promising discussions look to John von Neumann
(1903-57) and his quantum measurement theory.124 Yet while G6del's contri
butions are readily acknowledged by many, there is significant debate in the
literature regarding G6del's philosophical accomplishments in the field of logic,
and many scholars like to claim that it is easy to overstate the consequences of
G6del's incompleteness theorems. 125
This is noteworthy because beyond his work in mathematical logic, G6del's
ambitions were philosophical. As he wrote to the phenomenologically oriented
mathematician and philosopher Gian-Carlo Rota (1932-99), "Transcendental

120. Kurt Gode!, "Ober formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und ver
wandter Systeme I:' Monatshefte fur Mathematik 149(1) (1931] (September 20(6): 1-29.
121. Jean Cavailles, "On Logic and the Theory of Science:' in Kockelmans and Kisiel, Phenom
enology and the Natuml Sciences, 406, emphasiS added.
122. For general context including a specific discussion of Cavailles, see Alan D. Schrift,
Twentieth-Century rrcnch Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
2006), 36fT.; for discussion including Husserl and axiomatization, see Michael Roubach, "Hei
degger, Science, and the Mathematical Age," Science in Context IO( 1) (1997). I ,awlor also dis
cusses Cavailles in Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana L:niversity Press, 2002), 62ff.
123. CavaiW:s, "On Logic and the 'nlcory of Science:' 405.
124. J. W. Dawsol1, Jr., "What Hath G:iidel Wrought;' Syntlzese J 14 (199B).
12'). The one unifring characteristic of both popular and more recondite books on Ciidel
,eems to be impatience with other treatments of Godel in philosophicdlliterature, cultur,li
,tudie;;, ,\lld in other books on Giidel and mathematics.
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philosophy ... carried through, would be nothing more nor less than Kant's
critique of pure reason transformed into an exact science:'126 In particular.
Godel's interest in time was expressed in the same Kantian spirit, as Godel
believed. in Palle Yourgrau's paraphrase, that "the attempt to discover what
is fundamental about our thinking about time can receive no assistance from
physics which, he argued, combines concepts without analyzing them:'127 We
have instead to "reconstruct the original nature of our thinking:'128
It is regrettable, but unremarkable, given the differences between Anglo
American and continental styles of philosophizing, that throughout his life
Godel himself would be excluded from mainstream debate on the philosoph
ical reflections on the problems of physics and mathematical logic, and espe
ciallyon the philosophy of time. Yourgrau outlines one such example in detail:
Godel's contribution to Paul Schilpp's 1949 Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist
was judged to be mistaken, a judgment Yourgrau argues as seemingly made "on
principle" insofar as the presumption of error was not the result of but made in
advance of debate. 129 Even in the long course of the more than half century of
scholarship to follow, Yourgrau observes, "Go del's contribution to the Schilpp
volume had almost no impact on the community of philosophers:'130 In his view,
(Jode! was judged to lack the credentials needed to theorize as a philosopher
and, as a consequence, Gbdel's reflective efforts were denied a proper reception,
a refusal that continues within analytic philosophy to this day.131
The phenomenon of such academic exclusion is the common, all-too-political,
academic tendency to refuse what is not expressed in the style of the "profes
sion": just as Gbdel failed to employ the then-current writing style of analytic
philosophy, and failed to refer to the "right" names in American analytic philos
ophy, his own contributions to philosophy were refused access to the conversa
tion. In this sense, Godel stands as an example, one among many, of the closed
nature of certain domains within academic discourse and the unwillingness to
allow dissenting voices and voices coming from other traditions to have a share
in the conversation of philosophy. Sadly, this has been as true of philosophy of
science as it has been in the more "obviously" politicized discourses of social,
ethical, and political philosophy.

126. Citation in Yourgrau, A World without Time, 107.
127. Ibid., cf. Heidegger, History of tlIe Concept of Time.
128. Yourgrau, A World Ivithoul Time, 170.

129. Ibid., 119-20.
130. Ibid.
13 L Ibid., 121.
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